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T
he Federal Reserve, together with the other 
federal financial regulatory agencies, has had 
some experience in addressing the credit needs 
of underserved communities, using the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act (CRA) as our guide. The CRA 
encourages financial institutions not only to extend 
mortgage, small business, and other types of credit to 
lower-income neighborhoods and households, but also 
to provide investments and services to lower-income 
areas and people as part of an overall effort to build the 
capacity necessary for these places to thrive. 
Some critics of the CRA contend that by encouraging 
banking institutions to help meet the credit needs of low-
er-income borrowers and areas, the law pushed banking 
institutions to undertake high-risk mortgage lending. We 
have not yet seen empirical evidence to support these 
claims, nor has it been our experience in implementing 
the law over the past 30 years that the CRA has contrib-
uted to the erosion of safe and sound lending practices. 
In the remainder of my remarks, I will discuss some of 
our experiences with the CRA. I will also discuss the 
findings of a recent analysis of mortgage-related data by 
Federal Reserve staff that runs counter to the charge that 
the CRA was at the root of, or otherwise contributed in 
any substantive way to, the current subprime crisis. 
Regulatory Efforts to Meet Credit Needs 
in Underserved Markets 
In the 1970s, when banking was still a local enter-
prise, the Congress enacted the CRA. The act required 
the banking regulators to encourage insured depository 
institutions—that is, commercial banks and thrifts—to 
help meet the credit needs of their entire community, 
including low- and moderate-income areas. The CRA 
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does not stipulate minimum targets or goals for lending, 
investments, or services. Rather, the law provides incen-
tives for financial institutions to help meet the credit 
needs of lower-income people and areas, consistent with 
safe and sound banking practices, and commensurately 
provides them favorable CRA consideration for those 
activities. By requiring regulators to make CRA perfor-
mance ratings and evaluations public and to consider 
those ratings when reviewing applications for mergers, 
acquisitions, and branches, the Congress created an 
unusual set of incentives to promote interaction between 
lenders and community organizations. 
Given the incentives of the CRA, bankers have 
pursued lines of business that had not been previously 
tapped by forming partnerships with community orga-
nizations and other stakeholders to identify and help 
meet the credit needs of underserved communities. 
This experimentation in lending, often combined with 
financial education and counseling and consideration of 
nontraditional measures of creditworthiness, expanded 
the markets for safe lending in underserved communities 
and demonstrated its viability; as a result, these actions 
attracted competition from other financial services pro-
viders, many of whom were not covered by the CRA. 
In addition to providing financial services to lower-
income people, banks also provide critical community 
development loans and investments to address afford-
able housing and economic development needs. These 
activities are particularly effective because they lever-
age the resources available to communities from public 
subsidies and tax credit programs that are targeted to 
lower-income people. In just the past two years, banks 
have reported making over $120 billion in community 
development loans nationwide.2 This figure does not 
capture the full extent of such lending, because smaller 
1   This article is an excerpt from a speech given by Federal Reserve Governor Randall Kroszner titled “The Community Reinvestment Act and the 
Recent Mortgage Crisis.” The speech was delivered at the Confronting Concentrated Poverty Policy Forum at the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System in Washington, DC on December 3, 2008.
2	 	Data	are	from	filings	made	by	larger	banking	institutions	to	the	Federal	Financial	Institutions	Examination	Council	on	CRA-related	small	
business,	small	farm,	and	community	development	lending;	for	more	information,	see	FFIEC	website:	http://www.ffiec.gov/.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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institutions are not required to report community devel-
opment loans to their regulators. 
Evidence on the CRA and the  
Subprime Crisis
Over the years, the Federal Reserve has prepared two 
reports for the Congress that provide information on the 
performance of lending to lower-income borrowers or 
neighborhoods—populations that are the focus of the 
CRA.3 These studies found that lending to lower-income 
individuals and communities has been nearly as profit-
able and performed similarly to other types of lending 
done by CRA-covered institutions. Thus, the long-term 
evidence shows that the CRA has not pushed banks 
into extending loans that perform out of line with their 
traditional businesses. Rather, the law has encouraged 
banks to be aware of lending opportunities in all seg-
ments of their local communities as well as to learn how 
to undertake such lending in a safe and sound manner.
Recently, Federal Reserve staff has undertaken more 
specific analysis focusing on the potential relationship 
between the CRA and the current subprime crisis. This 
analysis was performed for the purpose of assessing 
claims that the CRA was a principal cause of the current 
mortgage market difficulties. For this analysis, the staff 
examined lending activity covering the period that cor-
responds to the height of the subprime boom.4 
The research focused on two basic questions. First, 
we asked what share of originations for subprime loans 
is related to the CRA. The potential role of the CRA 
in the subprime crisis could either be large or small, 
depending on the answer to this question. We found that 
the loans that are the focus of the CRA represent a very 
small portion of the subprime lending market, casting 
considerable doubt on the potential contribution that the 
law could have made to the subprime mortgage crisis. 
Second, we asked how CRA-related subprime 
loans performed relative to other loans. Once again, 
the potential role of the CRA could be large or small, 
depending on the answer to this question. We found that 
delinquency rates were high in all neighborhood income 
groups, and that CRA-related subprime loans performed 
in a comparable manner to other subprime loans; as 
such, differences in performance between CRA-related 
subprime lending and other subprime lending cannot lie 
at the root of recent market turmoil. 
In analyzing the available data, we focused on two 
distinct metrics: loan origination activity and loan per-
formance. With respect to the first question concerning 
loan originations, we wanted to know which types of 
lending institutions made higher-priced loans, to whom 
those loans were made, and in what types of neighbor-
hoods the loans were extended.5 This analysis allowed 
us to determine what fraction of subprime lending could 
be related to the CRA. 
Our analysis of the loan data found that about 60 per-
cent of higher-priced loan originations went to middle- or 
higher-income borrowers or neighborhoods. Such bor-
rowers are not the populations targeted by the CRA. In 
addition, more than 20 percent of the higher-priced loans 
were extended to lower-income borrowers or borrowers 
in lower-income areas by independent nonbank institu-
tions—that is, institutions not covered by the CRA.6 
Putting together these facts provides a striking 
result: Only six percent of all the higher-priced loans 
were extended by CRA-covered lenders to lower-
income borrowers or neighborhoods in their CRA 
assessment areas, the local geographies that are the 
primary focus for CRA evaluation purposes. This result 
undermines the assertion by critics of the potential for 













in areas outside the banking institutions’ local communities. Such lending is not the focus of the CRA and is frequently not considered in CRA 
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other words, the very small share of all higher-priced 
loan originations that can reasonably be attributed to 
the CRA makes it hard to imagine how this law could 
have contributed in any meaningful way to the current 
subprime crisis.
Of course, loan originations are only one path that 
banking institutions can follow to meet their CRA obliga-
tions. They can also purchase loans from lenders not 
covered by the CRA, and in this way encourage more 
of this type of lending. The data also suggest that these 
types of transactions have not been a significant factor 
in the current crisis. Specifically, less than two percent 
of the higher-priced and CRA-credit-eligible mortgage 
originations sold by independent mortgage companies 
were purchased by CRA-covered institutions. 
I now want to turn to the second question concerning 
how CRA-related subprime lending performed relative to 
other types of lending. To address this issue, we looked 
at data on subprime and alt-A mortgage delinquencies in 
lower-income neighborhoods and compared them with 
those in middle- and higher-income neighborhoods to 
see how CRA-related loans performed.7 An overall com-
parison revealed that the rates for all subprime and alt-A 
loans delinquent 90 days or more are high regardless of 
neighborhood income.8 This result casts further doubt 
on the view that the CRA could have contributed in any 
meaningful way to the current subprime crisis. 
Unfortunately, the available data on loan perfor-
mance do not let us distinguish which specific loans in 
lower-income areas were related to the CRA. As noted 
earlier, institutions not covered by the CRA extended 
many loans to borrowers in lower-income areas. Also, 
some lower-income lending by institutions subject to the 
law was outside their local communities and unlikely to 
have been motivated by the CRA.
To learn more about the relative performance of CRA-
related lending, we conducted more-detailed analyses to 
try to focus on performance differences that might truly 
arise as a consequence of the rule as opposed to other 
factors. Attempting to adjust for other relevant factors is 
challenging but worthwhile to try to assess the perfor-
mance of CRA-related lending. In one such analysis, we 
compared loan delinquency rates in neighborhoods that 
are right above and right below the CRA neighborhood 
income eligibility threshold. In other words, we com-
pared loan performance by borrowers in two groups of 
neighborhoods that should not be very different except 
for the fact that the lending in one group received spe-
cial attention under the CRA. 
When we conducted this analysis, we found es-
sentially no difference in the performance of subprime 
loans in Zip codes that were just below or just above the 
income threshold for the CRA.9 The results of this analy-
sis are not consistent with the contention that the CRA is 
at the root of the subprime crisis, because delinquency 
rates for subprime and alt-A loans in neighborhoods 
just below the CRA-eligibility threshold are very similar 
to delinquency rates on loans just above the threshold, 
hence not the subject of CRA lending.
To gain further insight into the potential relationship 
between the CRA and the subprime crisis, we also 
compared the recent performance of subprime loans 
with mortgages originated and held in portfolio 




income estimate for each Zip code, delinquency rates can be calculated directly from the LP data based on the Zip code location of the proper-
ties securing the loans. Second, delinquency rates for each relative income group (lower, middle, and higher) were calculated as the weighted 
sum of delinquencies divided by the weighted sum of mortgages, where the weights equal each Zip code’s share of the population in census 
tracts	of	the	particular	relative-income	group.		Relative	income	is	based	on	the	2000	decennial	census	and	is	calculated	as	the	median	family	
income of the census tract divided by the median family income of its metropolitan statistical area or nonmetropolitan portion of the state.  Both 
approaches yield virtually identical results. 
8   The analysis focused on loans originated from January 2006 through April 2008 with performance measured as of August 2008. However, a 
virtually identical relationship in loan performance across neighborhood income groups is found if the pool of loans evaluated is expanded to 
cover those originated in 2004 or 2005. The only material difference is that the levels of delinquency are lower for the loans covering longer 
periods. Loans that are 90 days or more delinquent include those that end in foreclosure or as real estate owned. Delinquency rates were some-
what	higher	in	the	lower-income	areas.		However,	the	somewhat	higher	delinquency	rates	in	lower-income	areas	is	not	a	surprising	result	be-
cause	lower-income	borrowers	tend	to	be	more	sensitive	to	economic	shocks	given	that,	among	other	things,	they	have	fewer	financial	resources	
on which to draw in emergencies.
9   The CRA neighborhood income threshold is where the neighborhood median family income is 80 percent of the median family income of 
the	broader	area,	such	as	a	metropolitan	statistical	area	or	nonmetropolitan	portion	of	a	state,	depending	on	the	specific	location	of	the	
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NeighborWorks America (NWA). As a member of the 
board of directors of the NWA, I am quite familiar with 
its lending activities. The NWA has partnered with 
many CRA-covered banking institutions to originate and 
hold mortgages made predominantly to lower-income 
borrowers and neighborhoods. So, to the extent that 
such loans are representative of CRA-lending programs 
in general, the performance of these loans is helpful in 
understanding the relationship between the CRA and 
the subprime crisis. We found that loans originated 
under the NWA program had a lower delinquency rate 
than subprime loans.10 Furthermore, the loans in the 
NWA affordable lending portfolio had a lower rate of 
foreclosure than prime loans. The result that the loans 
in the NWA portfolio performed better than subprime 
loans again casts doubt on the contention that the CRA 
has been a significant contributor to the subprime crisis.
The final analysis we undertook to investigate the 
likely effects of the CRA on the subprime crisis was to ex-
amine foreclosure activity across neighborhoods grouped 
by income. We found that most foreclosure filings have 
taken place in middle- or higher-income neighborhoods; 
in fact, foreclosure filings have increased at a faster pace 
in middle- or higher-income areas than in lower-income 
areas that are the focus of the CRA.11 
Two key points emerge from all of our analysis of the 
available data. First, only a small portion of subprime 
mortgage originations are related to the CRA. Second, 
CRA- related loans appear to perform comparably to 
other types of subprime loans. Taken together, as I stated 
earlier, we believe that the available evidence runs coun-
ter to the contention that the CRA contributed in any 
substantive way to the current mortgage crisis.
Conclusions
Our findings are important because neighborhoods 
and communities affected by the economic downturn 
will require the active participation of financial institu-
tions. Considering the situation today, many neighbor-
hoods that are not currently the focus of the CRA are 
also experiencing great difficulties. Our recent review 
of foreclosure data suggested that many middle-income 
areas currently have elevated rates of foreclosure filings 
and could face the prospect of falling into low-to-mod-
erate income status. In fact, 13 percent of the middle-
income Zip codes have had foreclosure-rate filings that 
are above the overall rate for lower-income areas. 
Helping to stabilize such areas not only benefits 
families in these areas but also provides spillover ben-
efits to adjacent lower-income areas that are the tradi-
tional target of the CRA. Recognizing this, the Congress 
recently underscored the need for states and localities 
to undertake a comprehensive approach to stabilizing 
neighborhoods hard-hit by foreclosures through the 
enactment of the new Neighborhood Stabilization Pro-
gram (NSP). The NSP permits targeting of federal funds 
to benefit families up to 120 percent of area median 
income in those areas experiencing rising foreclosures 
and falling home values. 
In conclusion, I believe the CRA is an important 
model for designing incentives that motivate private-sec-
tor involvement to help meet community needs. 
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